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Attorneys for Hub Cap Annie, Inc., 
a Nevada corporation 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
HUB CAP ANNIE, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
DON C. JENSEN and WHEEL 
COVER MARKETING, INC. 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 960592-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from Judgment Denying Sanctions and Costs 
Against Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Attorney 
Third Judicial District Court 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, Presiding 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Hub Cap Annie, Inc. ("HCA"), respectfully 
provides this Brief of Appellant as follows: 
STATEMENT OP CASE AND MATERIAL PACTS 
1. On August 17, 1994, HCA filed a Complaint. Record at 
page 1 ("R. p.l"). 
2. On October 4, 1994, Troy A. Richards was served with the 
Complaint against Wheel Cover. R. p.45. 
3. HCA is a Nevada corporation having its principal place of 
business in Las Vegas, Nevada. R. pp. 1, 70. 
4. Don is an individual residing in Salt Lake and San Pete 
Counties, Utah. R. pp. 1, 70. 
5. At all times material hereto, Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. 
("Wheel Cover") was a Utah corporation having its principal place 
of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. R. pp. 1, 70. 
6. Under Utah law, a corporation is required to register 
with the State of Utah and to maintain a current, accurate 
statement of some of the directors and officers of a corporation. 
The records of the State of Utah demonstrate that, at all times 
material hereto, Troy A. Richards was listed as a director of Wheel 
Cover. R. pp. 646, 647, 679, 687-690. 
7. Troy A. Richards ("Richards") was hired by Don to work 
for Wheel Cover. See pages of Transcript of Deposition of Troy A. 
Richards for Wheel Cover, pp. 6, 15. Richards managed the day-to-
day operations of the business for some time. Id. at 17. In 
addition, Don purchased a company vehicle and registered it in the 
name of Richards. Id. at p. 48. Further, Richards was a signatory 
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on the bank accounts of Wheel Cover. Id. at 18. JR. 1364-65, 1411-
1418. 
8. On or about July 26, 1993, Don filed the Profit 
Corporation Annual Report (generally "Annual Report") with the 
State of Utah, Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. In 
the 1993 Annual Report of Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc., Don 
designated Troy Richards as a director of the corporation. 
Further, Don listed himself as the registered agent at the address 
of 1108 East 33 00 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and as a director, 
at the address of 1124 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.1 See 
certified copy of records received pursuant to subpoena directed to 
the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. R. p.1439. 
9. On or about August 8, 1994, Don filed with the State of 
Utah, Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, the 1994 Annual 
Report for Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. In this Annual Report, Don 
1
 These two (2) addresses given by Jensen were not changed 
in the records of the State of Utah, and were the addresses at 
which HCA attempted to serve Mr. Jensen individually and as 
agent for Wheel Cover. As has been shown above, HCA was 
unsuccessful in locating Jensen at either of these two (2) 
locations. 
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again designates Troy Richards as a director of the corporation.2 
R. p.1442. 
10. Although the records with the State of Utah reflect the 
addition made by Don of Richards to the Board of Directors for 
Wheel Cover, there is no deletion or resignation of Richards. At 
all times material hereto, these records continued to show Richards 
as director of the corporation. R. p. 1439-43. 
11. On August 17, 1994, HCA filed a Complaint with the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
to initiate the above-entitled action. J?, p. 1. 
12. HCA attempted to serve Don, individually and for Wheel 
Cover, and James. In fact, Don called, stated that he had heard 
that HCA was attempting to prosecute this matter and provided 
information for the potential service of James, although it did not 
2
 Jensen has alleged that he found abuses by Mr. Richards 
regarding the checking account of Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. in 
June 1994, and therefore, was required to close the account. 
Further, Mr. Jensen alleges that he found numerous other abuses, 
purported embezzlements and other alleged misconduct late in the 
summer of 1994 and in July 1994. Thus, he states, and provides 
a document that only he signed to support this statement, that 
he removed Troy Richards from his position with the corporation 
on or about August 5, 1994. Clearly, this is in contrast with 
the filing of the Annual Report with the State of Utah, on or 
about August 8, 1994, and which was signed by Jensen and dated 
July 30, 1994. In addition to this clear question of 
credibility concerning Jensen's assertions in this matter, 
whether Troy Richards committed some misconduct is not an issue 
before the Court. HCA is not required to plead or prove the 
innocence of Troy Richards; it only is required to prove that he 
was a director of the corporation. The records of the State of 
Utah were not changed by Jensen, and Troy Richards was at the 
time of service, and now, listed as a director of the 
corporation. 
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result in service. Don, however, would not assist in service and 
would not accept service for himself or as the registered agent for 
Wheel Cover. Further, he did not provide an accurate address with 
the State of Utah for purposes of serving the registered agent of 
Wheel Cover. It was almost one year after filing the Complaint 
that HCA was able to effectuate service on Don. R. p. 1365. 
13. Initially after filing the Complaint, HCA sent the 
Constable with appropriate originals and copies of summons and 
complaints for service upon Don and Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc., as 
well as James R. Jensen. Prior to determining to serve and 
actually serving Troy A. Richards as a director for Wheel Cover 
Marketing, Inc., HCA made the following service attempts on 
Don/Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc.: 
DATE FOR ADDRESS FOR ATTEMPTED SERVICE 
SERVICE 
8/22/94 
8/23/94 
8/25/94 
8/30/94 
9/16/94 
9/19/94 
9/20/94 
1124 East 3300 South, 1108 East 3300 South 
and 135 West 3300 South 
1124 East 3300 South, 1108 East 3300 South 
and 135 West 3300 South 
1124 East 3300 South, 1108 East 3300 South 
and 135 West 3300 South 
1124 East 3300 South, 1108 East 3300 South 
and 135 West 3300 South 
98 Deer Run Road, # 69, Mount Pleasant, 
Utah 
98 Deer Run Road, # 69, Mount Pleasant, 
Utah 
98 Deer Run Road, # 69, Mount Pleasant, 
Utah 
9/26/94 98 Deer Run Road, # 69, Mount Pleasant, 
Utah 
R. p. 1366, 1419-30. 
14. Accordingly, HCA examined other methods for service of 
Wheel Cover. HCA followed the allowed method of serving a director 
of the company, Troy A. Richards. I?. p. 1366. 
15. Richards was served on September 29, 1994. R. p. 45. 
16. On or about October 10, 1994, Richards, for Wheel Cover, 
filed an Answer to the Complaint. This Answer did not include a 
Counterclaim or assert any affirmative defense. It, however, was 
an intended response to the Complaint. See Transcript of Richards, 
p. 41. R. p. 48. Further, the Answer states that Richards left the 
employment of Utah Wheels, however, it does not state that he 
resigned from the board of directors. Id. 
17. The Answer filed by Wheel Cover did not appear as a 
normal answer. Accordingly, on or about December 20, 1994, HCA 
attempted to obtain a Default Judgment against Wheel Cover. When 
it provided the Default Certificate, the proposed Judgment, the 
Statement of Attorney Regarding Fees and Costs for Default 
Judgment, the Request to Enter Default, and the Statement of 
Attorney for Entry of Default to the Clerk of the Court for 
acceptance and execution, the Clerk of the Court informed counsel 
for HCA that an Answer had been filed with the Court. The Default 
Judgment, therefore, could not be granted. R. p. 13 69. 
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18. Subsequently, on February 7, 1995, the deposition of Troy 
A. Richards and Wheel Cover was taken. Id. 
19. In the deposition, Richards confirmed that he had filed 
the Answer with the Court and that it was in response to the 
Complaint of which he had been served. See Transcript, at p. 41. 
R. p. 1410-18. 
20. On May 20, 1995, after nearly one year in attempts, Don 
was served with the Complaint. R. p. 68. 
21. On June 12, 1995, Don filed an Answer and Counterclaim to 
the Complaint. This Answer did not contain a defense concerning 
lack of personal jurisdiction or insufficiency of process. It was 
drafted, however, by Michael Jensen, even though Don purported to 
be a pro se defendant. R. p. 70. 
22. On July 17, 1995, after filing pleadings and sending 
interrogatories to HCA, Don first asserted the 120 day / 
insufficiency of process argument in his Verified Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim. This Amended Answer and Counterclaim were filed 
more than twenty (20) days after service of the original Answer and 
Counterclaim. The amendment of the Answer was without leave of 
Court and was not proper. R. p. 151. 
23. After the Court dismissed Don's first Counterclaim, HCA 
filed a second Motion to Dismiss, which also was granted by the 
Court. R. pp. 85, 183, 185, 193, 253, 256, 275, 284, 342, 344, 
354, 362. 
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24. On September 19, 1995, HCA filed its Reply in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Amended Counterclaim and an Affidavit 
describing and itemizing the fees and costs incurred in responding 
to the Amended Counterclaim. In its Memoranda, HCA emphasized that 
the Amendments did not change the defects in the previous 
Counterclaim. Also, the one new assertion made by Don, consisted 
of his assertion that Richards had not filed an Answer. The Court 
previously had determined that Richards had filed an Answer and had 
refused to grant a default judgment on that basis. Don should have 
known that his argument was wrong. An easy review of the file 
would have demonstrated to Don that this Answer had been filed and 
HCA would not have been required to respond to such assertions. 
Accordingly, HCA responded that Don was not entitled to an award of 
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, however, HCA was entitled to such an 
award. Thus, HCA filed the Affidavit substantiating and itemizing 
the attorneys fees and costs that subsequently were awarded by 
Judge Frederick. Id. 
25. On October 4, 1996, this Court entered a Minute Entry 
granting the Motion to Dismiss Amended Counterclaim on the reasons 
specified in the Memoranda. R. p. 344. 
26. On October 19, 1996, HCA filed and served a copy of the 
Order granting the Motion to Dismiss Amended Counterclaim. R. p. 
362. 
27. On October 23, 1995, Don filed a Motion and Memorandum to 
Strike Alleged Answer of T.A. Richards, Dated October 10, 1994 and 
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Filed October 21, 1994 ("Motion to Strike"). In the Motion to 
Strike, Don asserted that he, and only he, could be the agent for 
Wheel Cover, and that his Answer and Counterclaim should be the 
pleadings before the Court on behalf of Wheel Cover. This argument 
arose because the Counterclaim filed by Don was dismissed, in 
pertinent part, because he had attempted to assert claims that 
belonged to Wheel Cover. Don was not entitled to assert those 
claims; he had chosen to make himself unavailable for service of 
process, then, when HCA was able to obtain service through another 
means, Don was angry that he could not control the direction of the 
litigation involving Wheel Cover, the company. R. pp. 361, 310. 
28. On or about October 23, 1995, the Court, Honorable Dennis 
J. Frederick presiding, entered the Order granting the Motion to 
Dismiss Amended Counterclaim, including the award of attorneys fees 
and costs for having to respond to the various pleadings and non-
meritorious defenses presented by Don. R. p. 3 62. 
29. On November 22, 1995, the Court entered a Minute Entry 
denying Don's request for hearing on his Motion to Strike; ruling 
that the answer was for Wheel Cover Marketing, however, it was for 
a corporate defendant and not signed by an attorney, and therefore, 
should be stricken; granting default judgment to HCA against Wheel 
Cover Marketing, Inc. ; and declaring that Don must pay the 
sanctions previously imposed before the Court would consider any 
further pleadings from the defendant. R. p. 614. 
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30. On November 27, 1995, Don filed a Request for 
Clarification, Findings, and for Signed Order of Minute Entry Dated 
November 22, 1995. R. p. 640. 
31. On December 7, 1995, HCA filed a Default Judgment and 
Order on Defendants Motion to Strike Alleged Answer to T.A. 
Richards. R. p. 871. 
32. On January 5, 1996, the Court, Honorable Dennis J. 
Frederick presiding, entered a Minute Entry whereby the Court 
denied "Defendant Wheel Cover's Objections to Order for Default, 
Etc." and stated that the "Order on Defendant's Motion to Strike, 
Etc. and Default Judgment are executed January 5, 1996." R. p. 
869. 
33. On January 17, 1996, the Honorable Dennis J. Frederick 
recused himself from this matter because he reported Michael A. 
Jensen to the Utah State Bar for practicing law in the instant 
matter prior to being admitted to the Utah Bar on October 17, 1995. 
R. p. 900, 1357. 
34. On January 18, 1996, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
reassigned this case to the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler. R. p. 905. 
35. On or about January 18, 1996, Don filed a Motion for 
Hearing to Resolve all Pending Motions Before the Court. R. p. 
907. 
36. On or about January 22, 1996, Don filed a Motion to 
Compel the Plaintiff to Provide Details of Deposition of Troy 
Richards. R. p. 967. 
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37. On January 25, 1996, HCA filed a Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Compel Discovery and in Response to Motion for Protective 
Order. R. p. 983. 
38. On or about January 29, 1996, Don filed a Notice to 
Submit for Decision on Defendant's Motion for Protective Order. J?, 
p. 1059. 
39. On or about January 31, 1996, HCA filed a Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Temporarily Stay Judgments. R. p. 1083. 
40. On or about February 2, 1996, Don filed a Notice to 
Submit for Decision on Defendant's Motion to Temporarily Stay 
Judgments. R. p. 1143. 
41. On or about February 6, 1996, Don filed a Notice to 
Submit for Decision on Defendant's Motion for Hearing to Resolve 
all Pending Motions Before the Court. R. p. 1166. 
42. On February 23, 1996, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler 
entered a Minute Entry. In the Minute Entry, Judge Peuler ruled 
that she did not have authority to reconsider the Order entered by 
Judge Frederick on January 5, 1996, and did not decide on any 
motions filed by Don. Judge Peuler denied the Motion for 
Protective Order to Bar Depositions Temporarily. Judge Peuler 
denied a hearing to Resolve all Pending Motions filed by Wheel 
Cover. Judge Peuler ordered HCA to file information regarding the 
identity of the court reporter who took the deposition of Troy A. 
Richards. Judge Peuler denied the Motion to Temporarily Stay 
Judgments and Request for Hearing filed by Wheel Cover Marketing. 
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Judge Peuler ordered that a hearing should be set on the Motion to 
Dismiss the Complaint filed by Wheel Cover Marketing. R. p. 1253. 
43. Immediately upon receipt of this Minute Entry, HCA 
provided a copy of the Certificate from the Court Reporter to Don 
and sent a new Notice of Deposition scheduling the deposition of 
Don for March 7, 1996.. R. p. 1263. 
44. Even though this Court denied the Motion for Protective 
Order, Don refused and failed to attend the deposition. Michael 
Jensen sent correspondence to counsel for HCA stating that it was 
too hard for Don to attend and that Michael Jensen had a trial. 
HCA requested confirmation information from Michael Jensen for 
continuance of the deposition date. Michael Jensen refused to 
provide such information and stated that he was an officer of the 
court and we would just have to believe him. R. p. 1360. 
45. At the hearing before the Utah Supreme Court, on the 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief, Michael Jensen represented to 
the Court that this was his first hearing as an attorney. R. p. 
46. On or about March 1, 1996, Don filed with this Court a 
Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration of the Minute Entry 
dated February 23, 1996. R. p. 1298. 
47. On April 23, 1996, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, Third 
District Court Judge, entered a Minute Entry. R. p. 1605. 
48. The Minute Entry granted defendants1 Motion to Dismiss. 
R. p. 1605. 
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49. The Court held that Troy Richards was not a person 
contemplated under Rule 3 for service of process on a corporation. 
R. p. 1605. 
50. On or about May 3, 1996, defendants filed a Motion to 
Impose Rule 11 Sanctions Against Brenda L. Flanders. R. p. 1619. 
51. On May 13, 1996, plaintiff filed its Response to 
Defendants1 Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. R. p. 1667. 
52. On May 28, 1996, the Court entered a Minute Entry which 
set aside the Judgment that had been entered against Don Jensen on 
October 23, 1995, denied defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions 
and denied Defendants1 Motion for Clarification and 
Reconsideration. -R. p. 1723. 
53. Defendants, then, filed a proposed Order that did not 
conform to the Minute Entry ultimately signed by Judge Peuler. In 
fact, the Court expressly deleted terms attempted to be included by 
the defendants as follows: 
ORDERED, that the Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss is Granted 
without prejudice because the Plaintiff attempted to serve 
Defendant Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. by inoorrootly serving Mr. 
Troy A. Richards, who was not at the time a proper person for 
service as contemplated by Rule 3, Utah R. Civ. P., and who had 
advised—the—Plaintiff—e«—October—2-3^ 1994—that—he—had—»e 
association with the Defendant corporation, and no other Defendant 
was served within 12 0 days as required by Rule 3 . . .. 
R. p. 1730, 1734. 
54. The Order entered by the Court also vacated the Judgment 
entered by Judge Fredericks against Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc., 
but denied the attorneys fees requested by defendants; vacated the 
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Judgment entered against Don Jensen dated October 23, 1995; denied 
defendants1 Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions against Brenda L. 
Flanders, and denied defendants' Motion for Clarification and 
Reconsideration, "in which the Defendants' sought Rule 37 sanctions 
against Brenda L. Flanders". R. p. 1734. 
55. On July 8, 1996, defendants filed a Memorandum of Costs. 
R. p. 1737. 
56. On July 18, 1996, HCA filed its objection to the 
Memorandum of Costs. R. p. 1742. 
57. On August 21, 1996, the Court entered a Minute Entry 
denying the Motion to Tax Costs. R. p. 1760. 
58. On November 22, 1996, the Court entered a Minute Entry 
specifying as follows: 
The Court has received a letter from defendants' 
counsel, dated October 27, 1996. Counsel has previously 
been admonished by the Court to refrain from sending 
letters to the Court. However, in an attempt to prevent 
further needless pleadings which serve only to increase 
costs to both parties, and since the Court has previously 
ruled ont he issue raised by counsel's letter, the Court 
will not request further Motions to be filed in this 
matter. 
The matter of concern to defendants' counsel is his 
Memorandum of Costs filed in this action on July 8, 1996. 
Plaintiff filed an objection to defendants' Memorandum, 
and a Motion to Tax. The ruling of the Court was to deny 
defendants' costs set forth in his Verified Memorandum. 
In its earlier ruling, the Court inadvertently referred 
to defendants' Motion as one to tax costs. That was, 
pursuant to Rule 54, an inappropriate designation, as it 
was the plaintiff who sought to have the costs taxed. 
However, the prior Minute Entries are clear in their 
denial of defendants' Motion for costs. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Issue, Whether the trial court correctly denied Rule 37 
sanctions against Hub Cap Annie, Inc. and its attorney, Brenda L. 
Flanders, particularly when defendants had not sent formal 
discovery requesting the information sought by the Motion to 
Compel? 
Standard of Review. The imposition of sanctions is 
discretionary with the trial court. First, a formal discovery 
request must be made and that request must have not been complied 
with. Because the issue of sanctions is discretionary with the 
trial court, the decision of the trial judge will not be reversed 
absent an abuse of that discretion and such abuse must be clearly 
shown. Utah Dot v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4 (Utah 1995); Darrington 
v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Schoney v. Memorial 
Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied, 804 
P.2d 1232 (1990); 8A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure 2291 (1994) (discussing the federal rule). 
2. Issue. Whether the trial court correctly denied 
defendants1 Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions against Brenda L. Flanders 
when she demonstrated on a constant basis that thorough research 
and investigation had been conducted concerning the responses to 
Defendants1/Appellants1 motions to dismiss? 
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Standard of Review. "When reviewing a trial court's rule 11 
determination, we review the trial court's findings of fact under 
a clearly erroneous standard, the trial court's conclusion that 
rule 11 was violated under a correction of error standard, and the 
trial court's determination of the type and amount of sanction to 
be imposed under an abuse of discretion standard. Barnard v. 
Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1992). " Schoney v. Memorial 
Estates, Inc., et al., 863 P.2d 59 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993). 
"Rule 11 requires an attorney to make a reasonable inquiry 
to assure that the motion is "well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it 
is not interposed for any improper purpose." Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. 
P. Schoney, 863 P.2d 59. 
3. Issue. Whether the trial court correctly denied the 
costs requested by defendants? 
Standard of Review. This issue is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as 
follows: 
(5) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise 
provided for, upon a partnership or other 
unincorporated association which is subject to suit 
under a common name, by delivering a copy thereof 
to an officer, a managing or general agent, or 
other agent authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process and, if the agent is one 
authorized by statute to receive service and the 
statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the 
defendant. 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, in pertinent 
part, that 
ft]he signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certification by him that he has read the pleading, 
motion, or other paper; that to the best of his 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, 
and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
Rule 12(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in 
pertinent part: 
Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before 
responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is 
permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 
twenty days after the service of the pleading upon him, the 
court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient 
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 
scandalous matter. 
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Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
[a] party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served 
or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive 
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed 
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time 
within 2 0 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may 
amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in 
response to an amended pleading within the time remaining 
for response to the original pleading or within 10 days 
after service of the amended pleading, whichever period 
may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery, a party, upon 
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons 
affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling 
discovery as follows: 
. . . . 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question 
propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation 
or other entity fails to make a designation under Rule 
30(b) (6) or 31(a) , or a party fails to answer an interrogatory 
submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a 
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to 
respond that inspection will be permitted as requested or 
fails to permit inspection as requested, the discovering party 
may move for an order compelling an answer, or a designation, 
or an order compelling inspection in accordance with the 
request. 
Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as 
follows: 
(d) To whom awarded. Except when express provision 
therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in 
theses rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs . . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly denied the request for Rule 11 
sanctions against Brenda L. Flanders. Rule 11 simply requires that 
an attorney conduct sufficient legal research and factual inquiry 
to believe that there is a meritorious basis for the assertions 
made in pleadings. The record is replete with the investigation 
conducted by Flanders. The denial of the motion for sanctions is 
supported by the record and should be affirmed by this Court. 
Initially, Rule 37 sanctions are not available to defendants. 
Rule 37 applies to a failure to comply with formal discovery. There 
was no formal request for the material information. Further, the 
Court has discretion to determine that sanctions are not 
appropriate. The trial court's determination is supported by the 
record and should be affirmed. 
Rule 54(d) does not mandate an award of costs to defendants. 
In fact, the Rule expressly provides that the Court can deny such 
an award. In this case, the Court denied the costs requested by 
defendants and there is support in the record for such denial. 
Consequently, the trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT I 
THIS COURT CORRECTLY DENIED RULE 11 SANCTIONS AGAINST 
BRENDA L. FLANDERS 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, in pertinent 
part, that 
"[t]he signature* of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certification by him that he has read the pleading, 
motion, or other paper; that to the best of his 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, 
and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation." 
Brenda L. Flanders ("Flanders") consistently has made 
assertions in legal memoranda and oral arguments that are well 
grounded in fact and she reasonably has inquired into the existing 
law regarding the issues raised in this litigation. Flanders has 
verified information obtained from her client, HCA, has conducted 
discovery and has researched relevant case law and statutes 
governing the issues in this case. Flanders1 inquiry was 
reasonable under the circumstances. See Taylor v. Taylor^ 770 P.2d 
163, 170 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The trial court correctly 
determined that Flanders had not violated Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and therefore, denied defendants1 request for 
sanctions. 
20 
ARGUMENT II 
THE MOTION TO STRIKE AMENDED ANSWER DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
A RULE 11 VIOLATION 
Plaintiff relied on Rules 12 and 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure in its Motion to Strike Amended Answer and Counterclaim. 
The arguments used were based on legal and factual foundation. 
Rule 12(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in pertinent 
part: 
Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before 
responding to a pleading or/ if no responsive pleading is 
permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 
twenty days after the service of the pleading upon him, the 
court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient 
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 
scandalous matter. 
(Emphasis added). 
Further, Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, supports 
the assertion that Don could not amend his Answer and Counterclaim 
without leave of court. Rule 15(a) provides, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
[a] party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served 
or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive 
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed 
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time 
within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may 
amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in 
response to an amended pleading within the time remaining 
for response to the original pleading or within 10 days 
after service of the amended pleading, whichever period 
may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
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The Motion filed by the plaintiff was a Motion to Strike both the 
Amended Answer and the Counterclaim. The Amended Answer did not 
require a responsive pleading and Don filed his Amended Answer more 
than twenty (20) days after service of the original Answer. 
Consequently, Heritage Bank & Trust v. Landon, 770 P.2d 1009, 1010 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), is not applicable to the legitimacy of the 
Motion to Strike in reference to the Amended Answer. The Motion to 
Strike the Amended Answer was legitimate. 
In addition, as seen above, Rule 12(f), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, specifically provides for the filing of a Motion to 
Strike for "any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 
impertinent, or scandalous matter". The Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim did not contain any new substantive matter.1 
Plaintiff legitimately cited Rule 12(f) as support for the Motion 
to Strike Amended Answer and Counterclaim. The Court clearly had 
the authority to strike the pleading pursuant to Rule 12(f), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Heritage Case, 770 P. 2d 1009, 
does not preclude the filing of a Motion to Strike based on Rule 
12(f). 
Certainly, there was a legal and factual basis for the Motion 
to Strike Amended Answer filed by the Plaintiff. "It is enough 
that the attorney's reading of the law is a reasonable one. Thus, 
once an attorney forms a reasonable opinion after conducting 
appropriate research, the mere fact that the attorney's view of the 
law was wrong cannot support a finding of a rule 11 violation." 
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Barnard V. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992). Rule 11, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, does not provide for an award of sanctions 
based on the filing of the Motion to Strike. In addition, Don 
asserts that he incurred $20,000.00 in attorneys fees and costs as 
a consequence of the Rule 11 violation, however, Michael Jensen did 
not enter an appearance until October 20, 1995, and the Motion to 
Strike was filed on July 31, 1995. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE ASSERTION THAT RICHARDS WAS A DIRECTOR OP 
WHEEL COVER MARKETING, INC. FOR PURPOSES OP SERVICE OP PROCESS 
WAS BASED UPON SUBSTANTIAL INVESTIGATION AND INQUIRY 
Defendants asserted that sanctions should be ordered against 
Flanders because of her contention that Richards was a proper agent 
for service of process. HCA, through its counsel, conducted 
substantial investigation and inquiry into the relevant facts and 
law. It is true that Judge Peuler ultimately ruled against HCA, 
however, this is not the standard for determining Rule 11 
sanctions. See Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992). 
In this case, HCA, through its counsel Flanders, asserted that 
defendant, Wheel Cover, properly was served with the Complaint in 
this matter. Don avoided service of the Complaint; HCA attempted 
service on him individually and as registered agent for the 
corporation. Don knew that service was being attempted. He had 
the audacity to contact Flanders and to provide information 
concerning service of James Jensen, however, he would not provide 
his location for his service. HCA attempted to serve him on 
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numerous occasions. Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows 
and specifically provides for service upon an agent of the 
corporation. Troy Richards continued to be listed with the State 
of Utah by Wheel Cover and Don Jensen as a director for Wheel 
Cover. 
HCA found and provided to the court numerous facts to support 
Richards1 position as a director of the company. Most importantly, 
Don himself filed the Annual Reports with the State of Utah wherein 
Richards was declared to be a director. Further, even though Don 
filed the Articles of Dissolution, he did not remove Richards as a 
director of the corporation in the records maintained with the 
State of Utah. Don, clearly, was aware that Richards was listed as 
a director because he affirmatively prepared that notification and 
filed it with the State of Utah. Section 16-10a-1405, Utah Code 
Annotated, Effect of dissolution, provides in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
(1) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate 
existence but may not carry on any business except that 
appropriate to wrind up and liquidate its business and 
affairs, . . . 
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not: 
• . • . 
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards 
of conduct different from those prescribed in Part 
8; 
(d) change: 
(i) quorum or voting requirements for its 
board of directors or shareholders; 
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or 
removal of its directors or officers or both; 
or 
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(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or 
its articles of incorporation; 
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or 
against the corporation in its corporate name; 
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or 
against the corporation on the effective date of 
dissolution; or 
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent 
of the corporation. 
Don did not remove Richards as a director from the records 
maintained with the State of Utah until recently. Richards was a 
director, and therefore, an agent of the corporation for purposes 
of service of process. HCA previously had requested that default 
be entered against Wheel Cover, however, the Court refused to enter 
default on the basis that the "Company" had filed a responsive 
pleading to the Complaint filed by HCA. 
Rule 8, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires nothing more 
than that the respondent attempt to meet the allegations of the 
Complaint as to that specific defendant. Although Richards1 Answer 
was not technical in nature, he did attempt to meet the allegations 
in the Complaint, and did so as adequately as he was able. In 
fact, he succinctly stated that he believed Wheel Cover was a 
legitimate business, had operated in a legitimate fashion, was 
owned by Don to his knowledge and responded to accusations 
concerning his knowledge of the use of the franchised property of 
HCA. 
Utah law allows for service on a director of a corporation. 
Section 16-10a-504(3), Utah Code Annotated, specifically states 
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that lf[t]his section does not prescribe the only means, or 
necessarily the required means, of serving a corporation." 
Further, Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, 
in pertinent part, as follows: 
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as 
follows: 
• • • • 
(5) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise 
provided for, upon a partnership or other 
unincorporated association which is subject to suit 
under a common name, by delivering a copy thereof 
to an officer, a managing or general agent, or 
other agent authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process and, if the agent is one 
authorized by statute to receive service and the 
statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the 
defendant. 
By definition, a director is an "officer, a managing or 
general agent" and is an agent of the corporation for purposes of 
service of process. A "director" is "[o]ne who, or that which 
directs; as one who directs or regulates, guides or orders; a 
manager or superintendent, or a chief administrative official." 
Black's Law Dictionary, p. 460 (6th ed. 1990). Further, a director 
is a person "appointed or elected according to law, authorized to 
manage and direct the affairs of a corporation or company." Id. 
Don has admitted that he was in control of the business and was the 
majority stockholder. If he desired a change in the corporate 
records that had been filed with the State of Utah, he could have 
made such a change. Not only did Don not file a change with the 
State of Utah concerning the members of the Board of Directors, he 
filed a renewal of the corporate information after he allegedly 
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fired Richards that listed Richards as a director and he 
intentionally avoided service concerning the claims against the 
corporation. 
Richards was a director of Wheel Cover. At least, that is the 
information provided by the records contained by the State of Utah, 
which records were filed by Don. 
Flanders made reasonable inquiry of the Answer of Troy 
Richards and based her legal assertions on relevant statutory law 
of the State of Utah as stated in the preceding paragraphs. 
Flanders did not intentionally ignore the Articles of 
Dissolution. The Complaint was filed on August 17, 1994, the 
Articles of Dissolution were filed on September 14, 1994. Flanders 
has cited case law and the Utah Corporate Code regarding the 
responsibility of directors in numerous memoranda. Defendants1 
assertion that Flanders has not cited any rule, statute, or case 
law regarding the issues involved is a flagrant misstatement. 
Further, Donfs suggestion that his statement in his pleadings that 
Richards had been fired somehow negates all of the investigation 
conducted by Flanders is without merit. Termination of an employee 
does not remove that person as a director. In addition, Donfs 
assertion assumes that there has not been factual controversy and 
numerous assertions on his part that cannot simply be assumed as 
true. Finally, his statement is one part of the investigation 
conducted by Flanders, which investigation lead to numerous facts 
supporting the argument that Richards was a director for purposes 
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of service of process, and that investigation was sufficient to 
satisfy Rule 11 requirements. 
ARGUMENT IV 
FLANDERS DID NOT VIOLATE RULE 11 BY ASSERTING THAT DEFENDANTS 
HAD A DUTY TO MAKE CHANGES IN THE UTAH STATE 
CORPORATE RECORDS 
Defendants contend that Flanders violated Rule 11, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, by asserting that a corporation has a duty to 
notify the State of Utah of changes in its officers and directors. 
Again, Defendants make a grave misrepresentation to the Court. 
Flanders did not make this allegation. Flanders asserted that 
under Utah law, a corporation is required to register with the 
State of Utah and to maintain a current, accurate statement of some 
of the directors and officers of a corporation. Further, Flanders 
contended that the records of the State of Utah demonstrated that 
Troy Richards was listed as a director of Wheel Cover, and, that if 
Don desired a change in the corporate records he should have filed 
the change with the State of Utah. See Plaintiff's Response to 
Motion to Strike Answer, pp. 2, 17; Plaintiff's Response to Motion 
for Clarification and Reconsideration, pp. 7, 25-26; and 
Plaintiff's Response to All Motions Filed by Don C. Jensen that 
Remain Pending Before this Court Except the Motion for Extension to 
File Appeal, p. 5. 
Flanders did not violate Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure* Unfortunately, defendants, again, are attempting to 
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confuse the record by misrepresenting what was cited in the various 
memoranda. 
ARGUMENT V 
FLANDERS DID NOT VIOLATE RULE 11 WITH HER ASSERTION 
THAT THE REPORTERS' CERTIFICATE FOR TROY RICHARDS 
DEPOSITION WAS IN THE FILE 
The Court Reporter from Rocky Mountain Reporting Service 
mailed to Flanders a copy of the Reporter's Certificate concerning 
Richards deposition, which certificate identified the pertinent 
information concerning the deposition. The Court Reporter stated 
in the Certificate, that said Certificate had been mailed to the 
Court on June 21, 1995. In addition, when questioned, Flanders 
contacted the Court Reporting Agency and obtained an Affidavit 
concerning the filing of the Certificate with the Court. Flanders 
certainly conducted sufficient inquiry to assert that the 
Certificate was in the Court file. 
In addition, Flanders told Jensen that the Reporting Company 
was Rocky Mountain. Flanders did not violate Rule 11. 
Also, when the Court entered its Minute Entry concerning 
numerous items, Flanders immediately complied with this Court's 
Ruling regarding the provision of the requested information, even 
though Flanders had provided this information several times. 
Again, Flanders has not committed a Rule 11 violation. On February 
27, 1996, plaintiff filed a Notice of Compliance with the Order. 
Defendants continue to misrepresent that this information never was 
conveyed to them. Plaintiff has provided this information in 
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letters and legal memoranda that is in the Court's file. Flanders 
did not violate Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT VI 
FLANDERS DID NOT VIOLATE RULE 11 BY ASSERTING THAT 
THE COURT PREVIOUSLY RULED ON SERVICE AND ATTORNEYS FEES 
Defendants continue to allege that Flanders did not cite to 
the record and that the Court has not determined that Wheel Cover 
was sufficiently served and that the Court did not grant plaintiff 
sanctions. On October 23, 1995, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, 
Third District Court Judge, executed an Order on Plaintiff's Motion 
to Dismiss Amended Counterclaim. This Order granted the Motion to 
Dismiss Amended Counterclaim which argued that Richards was the 
proper agent to accept service for Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. In 
addition, HCA requested that sanctions be awarded in favor of HCA 
for having to respond to the Amended Counterclaim that was filed 
without authority, which sanctions were granted to HCA and against 
Don, by the Court in the amount of $1,156.32. Flanders has relied 
on the Court's Order and has not randomly and baselessly made 
frivolous arguments. The arguments have been based on merit. 
Flanders has not violated Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In addition, defendants previously have requested fees against 
plaintiff and Flanders based on Rule 11, and specifically made this 
request in their Motion to Dismiss Complaint. In the Minute Entry, 
the Court ruled that "Defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees is 
denied." 
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ARGUMENT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEPENDANTS7 
REQUESTS FOR RULE 37 SANCTIONS 
Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, expressly applies to 
a party's failure to permit or comply with formal discovery. Don 
never requested the information concerning Richards Deposition by 
formal discovery. Consequently, defendants were not entitled to 
sanctions. 
Additionally, Rule 37(a) (4) dictates that an award of fees and 
costs should not be granted if the court finds that the opposition 
to the Motion was substantially justified or that such an award 
would be unjust. HCA never opposed providing the information to 
defendants. 
In fact, HCA had previously provided the information requested 
by Don. This information was provided in both verbal and written 
form. Further, an affidavit was filed with the trial court wherein 
the Court Reporting Agency, Rocky Mountain, certified that a copy 
of the Certificate of Transcript was mailed to the Clerk of the 
Court. 
HCA previously informed Don that Rocky Mountain conducted the 
deposition of Richards. This was and is accurate information. A 
motion to compel was not required. 
Finally, HCA immediately sent to defendants1 counsel a copy of 
the Certificate provided by the Court reporter upon receipt of the 
Court's Minute Entry. 
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An award of fees pursuant to Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, was not appropriate because Rule 37 is not applicable to 
this matter, the defemdants were not required to file the Motion 
because the information previously had been provided and such an 
award would be unjust under the circumstances of this case. The 
decision of the trial court to deny the request for sanctions was 
not an abuse of discretion or a legal error. Certainly, the ruling 
should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE COSTS 
REQUESTED BY DEFENDANTS 
Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that costs 
shall be allowed to the prevailing party "unless the court 
otherwise directs". The trial court clearly has discretion to deny 
any award of costs. In addition, there was substantial reason to 
deny the costs requested by the defendants in their Memorandum. 
First, the defendants must prove that the costs were 
necessarily incurred in the proceeding. Jensen has listed two 
costs for which they seek reimbursement. The first is the cost for 
filing the Counterclaim and requesting a jury. The filing of the 
counterclaim and the request for a jury were not necessary in this 
case. The costs related thereto should not be taxed. The 
Counterclaim was dismissed by the Court. Further, the relief 
granted was not pursucint to the Counterclaim, but simply was a 
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dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to a Motion to Dismiss. The 
filing fee, therefore, should not be required to be reimbursed by 
the HCA. 
As to the Jury Fees, certainly, these were not necessarily 
incurred in this case. No jury was utilized. Again, the substance 
of the case was not visited by the Court. The Complaint was 
dismissed based upon a ruling that service was not adequate. The 
Motion to Dismiss could have been filed and determined prior to the 
filing of any Counterclaim or request for Jury. The Answer filed 
by Don Jensen apparently did not submit the defendants to the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Accordingly, there was no necessity of 
filing the Answer and Counterclaim. The Counterclaim filing fees 
and Jury fees, therefore, were not necessarily incurred in this 
case and HCA should not be required to reimburse the defendants for 
these costs. 
Next, defendants request reimbursement for the costs of 
obtaining a copy of the deposition of Troy Richards. The Court 
ruled that service was improper based upon the "Answer11 that was 
filed by Troy Richards. The Court held that "Richards was not a 
person contemplated under Rule 3 for service on a corporation. 
Regardless of whether plaintiff had prior knowledge of Richards1 
disassociation with the defendant corporation, plaintiff was so 
advised by Richards1 October 21, 1994 filing." The October 21, 
1994 filing was in the Court file. It was not necessary for the 
defendants to expend costs for the deposition of Troy Richards to 
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obtain the current result. The deposition was not utilized in the 
Court's determination. Consequently, the costs of obtaining the 
deposition transcript should not have been ordered to be reimbursed 
by HCA. 
The Motion to Dismiss could have been and was granted without 
consideration of the Answer and Counterclaim filed by Jensen, 
without and prior to emy involvement with a jury and absent use of 
the deposition transcript of Troy Richards. None of these costs 
were necessarily incurred in this matter. The trial court was 
within its discretion to deny the request for costs made by 
defendants. The order should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Flanders did not violate Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Further, the fees requested by Jensen were not 
itemized, and were not shown to have been incurred as any kind of 
a result of any violation of Rule 11. Although ultimately the 
court ruled against the arguments asserted by HCA through its 
counsel, Flanders, the record is replete of information concerning 
the legal research and factual investigation conducted to 
substantiate the allegations made in the pleadings. Jensen was not 
entitled to an award of sanctions based upon Rule 11. 
Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, applies to the failure 
to comply with formal discovery requests. There was no formal 
discovery request made in this case concerning the provision of 
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information regarding the Richards Deposition. In addition, there 
certainly was information that the information had been provided. 
Finally, Flanders immediately complied with the Order of the Court 
and provided the information, again. The ruling of the trial court 
is substantiated by the record in this matter and should be 
affirmed. 
Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does not mandate 
the award of costs to defendants. The Rule specifically allows the 
trial court to deny such an award. This is a case in which costs 
should not be awarded. HCA has simply pursued this case in 
accordance with the on-going rulings of the Third Judicial District 
Court. The costs sought by defendants were not necessarily 
incurred by defendants in this case. The denial of an award of 
those costs is supported by the record and should be affirmed. 
WHEREFORE, HCA respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
the trial court's determination to deny the Rule 11 sanctions, the 
Rule 37 sanctions and the request for costs, and grant such further 
relief as the Court adeems proper. 
DATED this I O^^day of June, 1997. 
/ 
i 
CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of June, 1997, I served 
two copies of the forgoing Brief of Appellee on the following, by 
depositing copies thereof in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Michael A. Jensen 
Attorney at Law 
First Interstate Plaza, Ninth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1655 
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